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Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in
Different Market Structures: the Tunisian Mobile Market Case
Sami DEBBICHI ∗and Walid HICHRI †
February 24th 2013
Abstract
We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly
Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold
for collusion depends on the interconnection fees. The different threshold values calculated in each Mar-
ket structure are then estimated, using the OLS method, with variables related to the Tunisian market
structures and prices. The Econometric estimation of the different threshold values is consistent with
our theoretical results. Our findings can be used by the decision makers to control collusion, by acting
on the level of interconnection fees for each market structure and by implementing the suitable market
liberalization policies in this sector.
Key Words: Interconnexion fees, Collusion, Market Structure, Private sector, Public Sctor, Tunisian
Mobile Market.
JEL Classification: D47, L13, L51, L96
1 Introduction:
The mobile telephony market had known in the recent years a dynamic and changing structure in most of the
countries who have undertaken to reform their telecommunications sectors. Depending on the characteristics
of the local market (private or public sector) resulting from the restructuration and the implementation of
progressive market liberalization policies, the number of actors (duopoly or oligopoly) and consequently their
profits in the telecommunications industry has been variable. At the same time, some changing in the market
structure was the result of a strategic behavior adopted by the several economic operators. In this context,
collusion is one of the possibilities and strategies (Colombier et al. (2010)) that actors may adopt to control
the market.
Laffont and Tirole (2000) present a study of competition in telecommunications, and a view of this
competition from the United States was presented by Parsons (2002). In general, the Mobile telephony
markets are either a duopoly, or an oligopoly, with a mix of private and public agents. They are facing an
increasing number of customers. In such a context, there is no perfect competition and the telecommunications
suppliers have generally the market under control. However, the decisions of the different actors directly
influence each others, especially in presence of interconnection fees in the mobile telephony market.
∗AEDD, University of Tunis El Manar
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In fact, the Mobile telephony markets are originally a public monopoly, especially in the developing
countries. The continuous and rapid changes in this sector oblige the decision makers to allow the entrance
of private actors on the market, which suppose that the new entrants can have access to the existing network.
Thus, this supposes a regulation of the interconnection fees that prevent the monopoly, while supplying
interconnection services to new entrants, to charge high prices of interconnection that prevent the settlement
of a real competition on the market (Girardi (2007), Abdel Jaoued (2001), Schiff (2005)). The interconnection
fees have real economic issue and consequences, as shown in Baranes and Poudou (2010), Bulatovic (2004),
Flochel (1999) and Baranes and Flochel (1999).
While the network interconnection prices are based upon costs in several developed countries (for example,
this is the case in France), it is difficult to calculate and to provide interconnection services fairly and efficiently
in the developing ones (Um et al. (2004)).
Several studies have already highlighted the determinants of the choice of colluding (Parker and Roller
(1997) and Hoﬄer (2009)), and especially its relationship with the level of interconnection fees. In his study
of this relationship among the suppliers of internet, Cortade (2005) shows that the preference for collusion
does not depend on the level of the access fees, when the market structure is vertically separated. As shown
in different applications in Penard (1997), collusion is a strategic behavior chosen by economic agents when
the result is better in comparison with competition. Also, telecommunications networks may even use a high
access charge as an instrument of collusion (Dessein(2003)).
We present in this paper a theoretical study of different market structures in presence of interconnection
fees. We calculate the critical threshold of collusion, that is the level of interconnection fees from which
the operators switch from/to collusion. The comparison of the different results permits to optimize and to
control the degree of liberalization of the economy.
Our theoretical results are confronted with an econometric estimation of the threshold level of interco-
nenction fees regarding to the decision of colluding. The data concerns the Tunisian mobile market. The
choice of Tunisia, as a representative of the mobile phone market in most of the developing countries is due
to the dynamic and important changes in this market during the last decade.
The market structure of the mobile phone in Tunisia has gone through several stages, from the monop-
olistic structure (1992-2001), to the duopolistic one (2002-2009) until reaching a three operators structure
(from 2010 until today). In addition to the market structure, there has been changes in the market shares
of the public and the private operators. Indeed, the privatization of Tunisia Telecom (T.T.) (the historical
national operator) in 2006 transformed (theoretically) the market from a mixed (Private-Public) duopoly to
a private one. With the entry of Orange Tunisia on the market in 2010, one should talk about a three private
operators market. Obviously, the preference for collusion is certainly not the same in these different market
structures.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the theoretical framework in a Cournot competition
market and specifies the strategic behavior of the operators according to the threshold of interconnection
fees in a repeated game. We present thereafter, the interconnection fees in a duopoly (Section 2) and in
an oligopoly (Section 3) market structure with private, mixed and public operators. We try to express the
threshold of preference for collusion depending on the interconnection rate in these two scenarios, and to
determine the optimal level for which the incentive to collude is higher. The different results obtained are
discussed in Section 4.
Finally, the different threshold values calculated in each Market structure are estimated econometrically
(Section 5) with the OLS method, using variables related to the Tunisian market structures and prices on
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this market.
2 Theoretical Framework in a Duopoly Market
Let’s assume N operators on the Phone Market, who have the choice between colluding and competing. The
incitation to collude will depend on the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) that is related
to the discount factor δ of each operator.
Each operator has to choose between two strategic behaviors: either competing or colluding, regarding
to the comparison between short-term gains to deviate and long-term losses after deviation, in a repeated
game. In such a context, collusion is possible when the preference for the present, reflected by the discount
rate r (with δ = 11+r and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) is very low (Friedman (1971)).
Players are concerned with an indefinitely repeated sequential game where in the first stage, at period t
= 0, they decide to collude. If they cooperate in period t = 1, player i, where i = {1, 2} (N = 2) realizes a
profit equal to piColli . A unilateral deviation from collusion will change this profit to piDevi , with piDevi > piColli .
We assume that a deviation of one player in period t will be followed by a change in the cooperative behavior
of the other operator in period t+1 such that the profit of each operator becomes equal to piCompi , as both
operators deviate from collusion.
Calculations of the updated value of profit after Deviation V Dev and the updated value of profit after
Collusion V Coll show that:
V Dev =
∞∑
t=1
δtpiCompi =
δ
1− δ pi
Comp
i
and
V Coll =
∞∑
t=1
δtpiColli =
δ
1− δ pi
Coll
Collusion is a better strategy if the profit resulting from Deviation, in a repeated game, is lower than the
difference between the updated value of profit after Collusion and the updated value of profit after Deviation:
δ
1− δ
(
piColli − piCompi
)
> piDevi − piColli
From this inequality, we can calculate the threshold of the discount factor δ¯ from which collusion becomes
possible:
δ > δ¯ = pi
Dev
i − piColli
piDevi − piCompi
Consequently, if the value of δ for one operator is higher than δ¯, collusion will be the best strategy to
choose. We will discuss next the variation of δ¯ when the interconnection fees a vary to see, for each value of
a, the variation of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.).
2.1 A Duopoly Market with Private operators:
We assume that the number of operators is equal to two (N = 2), and that, in absence of a public operator,
each agent will try to maximize his profit. We assume that they compete in a Cournot Market. The profit
3
function of one operator i ̸= j where i and j ∈ {1, 2}, in presence of interconnexion fees a, is equal to:
pii = (Pi(Q)− a) .qij + a.qji
where Pi(Q) = Pj(Q) = 1−Q is the price function and Q = qij+qji is the total quantity of interconnection
produced by both operators. The resulting reaction function of player i is equal to:
qij(qji) =
1− qji − a
2
In such a contex, the optimal quantity to be produced by operators i and j is:
q∗ij = q∗ji =
1− a
3
and the resulting profit is:
pi∗i = pi∗j =
(1 + 2a) . (1− a)
9
If both operators decide to collude with equal sharing of profits, the joint profit piJ can be written as
follows:
piJ = (P (Q)− a) .Q+ a.Q = (1−Q) .Q
Maximizing this joint profit gives us a total quantity produced Q∗J equal to 1/2 and a total joint profit piJ
equal to 1/4, which corresponds, with the equal sharing rule, to a quantity per operator qCollij = qCollji equal
to 1/4 and a profit of collusion piColli = piCollj equal to 1/8.
Suppose that one of the two operators (player i) chooses to deviate from the collusive agreement. In
this case, it is assumed that his rival keeps constant his output level (1/4) after the collusion strategy. The
quantity produced by player i with defection is:
qDevij =
1
2 .
(
3
4 − a
)
The profit of player i resulting from deviation is then:
piDevij =
(
1− qDevij − qCollij − a
)
.qDevij + aqCollji
Calculations show that
piDevij = piDevji =
9
64 +
1
4a
(
a− 12
)
Using the equation calculated previously, the threshold discount factorsδ¯, above which collusive agreement
is sustainable, is the same for both players and is equal to:
δ¯ =
1
64 +
1
4a
(
a− 12
)
9
64 +
1
4a
(
a− 12
)− 19 (1 + 2a) (1− a) = 917
This result shows that, in a private duopoly in presence of Cournot competition, the critical threshold of
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preference for collusion (C.T.P.C) δ¯ is constant. Thus, the preference for collusion doesn’t depend in such a
market structure on the value of interconnection fees a.
2.2 A Duopoly Market with Mixed operators:
In presence of two operators of different natures, while the private one (player i) continue the maximization
of his profit pii, we assume that the public operator (player j) maximizes the collective profit pij , representing
the sum of the consumers’ surplus and pii:
pii = (1− qij − qji − a) .qij + aqji
pij =
 Q
0
P (Q)dQ− P (Q).Q+ pii = 12 (qij + qji)
2 + (1− qij − qji − a) .qij + aqji
The quantities at the equilibrium for both players are q∗ji = (1−a) for the public operator and q∗ij = 0 for
the private one. The resulting profits are respectively pi∗i = a(1− a) and p˜i∗j = 12 (1− a)2. Consequently, the
private operator will not produce and has a positive profit resulting from the presence of externalities and
interconnection fees of the public operator.
The comparison between both profits shows that pi∗i > p˜i∗j if the interconnection fees a > 13 .
If both operators decide to collude, they will maximize their joint profit piJ , where:
piJ =
1
2Q
2 + (1−Q− a)Q+ aQ
The solutions of this program are Q∗J = 1 and pi∗J = 12 . An equal sharing of the market and profits gives
then for each operator an interconnection quantity equal to 12 and a profit equal to
1
4 .
Suppose that the private operator (player i) deviates from collusion and maximizes his own profit piDevi ,
while the public operator still continue cooperating. In such a context, the public operator will continue
producing a quantity qJji equal to 12 and the private operator will produce a quantity qDevij equal to
1
2 (
1
2 − a)
and will generate a profit piDevi = 14a(a+1)+
1
16 . The critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.)
δ¯ is then equal to:
δ¯ =
a2 + a− 34
5a2 − 3a+ 14
This threshold vary with interconnection fees, and if the discount factor of one operator is higher that δ¯,
then collusion is the best strategy.
2.3 A Duopoly Market with Public operators:
Although this case is not realistic, as we rarely find sectors with two public agents, it remains interesting to
compare the results of this market configuration with the two previous cases.
With two public operators, where each agent maximizes the collective surplus, each one produces a
quantity equal to (1 − a), and makes a profit equal to (1 − a). If both operators collude and share equally
the market, each one will produce a quantity equal to 12 and will make a profit equal to
1
4 . However, if
one of them deviates, he will produce a quantity equal to (1 − a), which allows him with a profit equal to
1
2a
2 − 12a+ 58 . In this case, the critical threshold of preference for collusion is:
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δ¯ =
a2 +−a+ 34
a2 + a− 34
As in the previous market structure, The threshold vary with interconnection fees, and the operator will
collude if his discount factor δ is higher that δ¯.
3 Theoretical Framework with three operators:
Assuming that the number of operators on the market is equal to three (N = 3), we’ll present successively
different market structures where the number of private operators varies from three to zero.
3.1 An oligopoly Market with three private operators:
We’ll suppose in this section that there are three operators i, j and k, where i, j and k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
i ̸= j ̸= k. The profit of operator i depends on the quantity qij he puts in competition with operator j, but
also on the quantity qik he puts in competition with operator k. The total quantity produced by the operator
i is qi = qij + qik. The total quantity available on the market is Q = qi + qj + qk.
Each operator tries to maximize his profit. The profit of operator i is:
pii = (Pi(Q)− a)(qij + qik) + a(qji + qki)
With a price function P (Q) = 1−Q, maximizing the profit of each operator regarding to the total optimal
quantity he puts on the market, shows that qi = qj = qk = 1−a4 . These quantities allow each operator with
a same profit equal to (1+a).(1−3a)16 .
If the three operators decide to collude, they will realize a joint profit equal to 34 , which corresponds to
an individual profit piColli equal to 14 and to a same share of production equal to
1
6 for each operator.
To study the effect of deviation from collusion, suppose that agent i deviates and maximizes his own
profit piDevi , and let’s assume that agents j and k maintain their cooperative behavior. Such a behavior will
permit player i to realize a profit piDevi equal to 34a
2 − 16a+ 19 .
In this case, the threshold of the discount factor δ¯ is equal to:
δ¯ =
3
4a
2 − 23a− 354
3
4a
2 − 23a+ 19 − 116 (1− a)(1− 3a)
This threshold, above which collusion is preferred to deviation, is still calculated as in the duopoly case
and varies with interconnection fees a.
3.2 A mixed oligopoly Market with one public and two private operators:
A mixed oligopoly is a particular market structure where the private and public operators do not have the
same characteristics. The differences can concern the technology used by each operator (Ouatara (2011)).
But even when these different operators have the same technology, the possibility of merging may be possible
only under some restrictions (Artz et al (2009)).
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Let’s assume now that the market is composed of one public and two private operators (see De Donder
(2005) for an example of competition of a public firm in a mixed oligopoly). In such a context, the private
agents i and j will continue maximizing their own profits, while the public operator k will maximize the total
surplus. The two profits and the surplus function are respectively as follows:
pii = (1− (qij + qik)− (qji + qjk)− (qki + qkj)− a) .(qij + qik) + aqji + aqki
pij = (1− (qij + qik)− (qji + qjk)− (qki + qkj)− a) .(qji + qjk) + aqij + aqkj
pik =
1
2 (qki + qkj + qji + qjk + qij + qik)
2+(1− qki − qkj − qji − qjk − qij − qik − a) .(qki+qkj)+aqjk+aqik
We still assume that the demand function is P (Q) = 1−Q. Operator i will maximize his profit regarding
the total quantity (qij + qik) of calls on the network. The two other operators will behave in a symmetric
way. Consequently, the first order conditions obtained from the resolution of the previous equations show
that (q∗ij + q∗ik) = (q∗ji + q∗jk) = 0 and (q∗ki + q∗kj) = (1− a).
As a result, the private operators i and j realize the same profit (respectively pi∗i and pi∗j ) equal to
a(1−a)
2 .
However, the public operator will realize a profit pi∗kequal to
(1−a)2
2 .
This means that the private operators will not produce strategically any quantities, and in presence of
externalities, they will realize a positive profit.
In the case where the three operators decide to collude, they will behave as a monopoly, and maximize
their joint profit piJ , where:
piJ =
1
2Q
2 + (1−Q− a)Q+ aQ
The optimal quantities produced in such a context are such that the total quantity of interconnection
produced by the three operators isQColl = 1, which corresponds to an equal share of the market corresponding
to 13 for each operator. Consequently, the total profit resulting from collusion is equal to
1
2 , and the individual
profit for each operator is equal to 16 .
To understand the consequences of deviation in an oligopoly market with one public and two private
operators, we’ll assume that one of the two private agents, say operator i, deviates from the situation of
collusion. This assumption is more close to reality, as the public operator maximizes the total surplus, and
doesn’t have the willingness to make profits.
By choosing collusion, operator i maximizes his profitpiDevi while assuming that the two other operators
will not change their strategies on the market and will continue looking for collusion by producing quantities
equal to 13 for each operator. Meanwhile, the private operator looking for deviation will produce a quantity
(qDevij +qDevik ) = 12 (
1
3−a) and will generate a profit piDevi = 14a2+ 16a+ 136 . The critical threshold of preference
for collusion (C.T.P.C.) δ¯ is then equal to:
δ¯ =
3a2 + 2a− 53
9a2 − 4a+ 13
This threshold still depends on interconnection fees a.
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3.3 A mixed oligopoly Market with one private and two public and operators:
This market structure with one private and two public operators is not realistic, as it is difficult to find in the
same market two public agents. Nevertheless, this can be the case when collusion concerns different countries
that are trying to merge their economies, or some regions of the world that are trying to set up a political or
economic union.
Our model shows that in the case where there are two public operators, in presence of only one private
operator, the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) remains the same than the one found
in the previous case. Thus, we find that in a mixed market structure with three operators, the number of
private or public operators has no effect on the preferences for collusion.
3.4 An oligopoly Market with three public operators:
Although the case of a market with three public operators, as in the previous market structure, can be
studied only in very specific and transitional situations, the comparison with the other market structures still
remains very interesting.
If each public operator maximizes the total surplus, the resulting optimal quantities produced by each
one is equal to (1−a)3 and the individual profits are the same and equal to
−5
18 a
2 + 29a +
1
18 . However, the
strategy of collusion allows each operator to produce a quantity equal to 16 and to make a profit equal to
1
6 .
If one of the three public operators, say operator i, deviates from collusion, the optimal total quantity he
should produce is equal to ( 13 − a), consequently to the maximization of his profit:
piDevi =
1
2(q
Dev
ij +qDevik )2+(1−(qDevij +qDevik )−(qCollji +qColljk )−(qCollki +qCollkj )−a)(qDevij +qDevik )+a(qCollji +qCollki )
The maximized profit is equal to piDevi = 12a2+
1
18 . Thus, the critical threshold of preference for collusion
δ¯ is equal to 9a2−212a2−4a .
We present in section 4 a discussion of the relationship between the critical threshold of preference for
collusion (C.T.P.C.) and interconnection fees a in all the market structures presented previously.
4 Results and Discussion
Our results show that the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) depends on the intercon-
nection fees a when the market structure is composed of three operators, regardless of whether the operators
were private or public. This is also the case in presence of only two operators, except when both operators
are private.
As shown in the following figures, the critical threshold of preference for collusion function is decreasing
and convex in a duopoly (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 : Variation of the Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) with Interconnection
Fees a in a Duopoly Market Structure.
The critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) becomes increasing and concave, at least for
certain values of interconnection fees a, in presence of three operators (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 : Variation of the Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion (C.T.P.C.) with Interconnection
Fees a in Presence of Three Operators on the Market.
Consequently, the relationship between this threshold and interconnection fees a is changing and varies
with market structure.
In fact, as δ¯ is equal to:
δ¯ = pi
Dev
i − piColli
piDevi − piCompi
= F (a)
G(a)
if the value of δ for one operator is higher than δ¯, collusion will be the best strategy to choose. This is the
case for all the points that are above the curves represented in Figures 1 and 2. According to these figures,
9
in a duopoly market, as interconnection fees a increase, it becomes easier for the operators to collude, except
for the two private operators case where the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) do not
vary with interconnection fees. However, for the same variation of interconnection fees, collusion becomes
more difficult to realize in presence of three operators.
While the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) never reaches its minimum possible
value in the three cases of the duopoly market structure, this Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion
(C.T.P.C.), in a three operators purely public and mixed markets, never reaches the maximum value equal
to one. It reaches such a value only in the case of a purely private market structure with three operators,
when interconnection fees increase to 1.6 (see Figure 2).
The concavity of the increasing function of δ¯ in a three operators market means that, as interconnection
fees increase, the interest to deviate from collusion (F(a)) increases less in comparison to the increase of the
interest to deviate from competition (G(a)). It becomes then more and more difficult to collude.
Figure 2 shows also that, when interconnection fees value a is low (lower than 1.2), collusion is more
easy to realize in a market structure with three private operators. However, for higher values of a, collusion
becomes more difficult in this market structure than in the three other cases with three operators.
5 Econometric estimation of the critical threshold of preference
for collusion in the Tunisian phone market
The Tunisian mobile market structure was historically an public monopoly with one operator (Tunisia Tele-
com (T.T.)). Since 2002, a private operator (Tunisiana) has entered on the market. In 2006, the public
operator (Tunisia Telecom (T.T.)) becomes a private one. Finally, in 2010, a third private operator (Orange
Tunisia) joined the market to transform the duopoly private structure into a three private operators market.
As mentioned in Debbichi and Ben Khalifa (2013), “one of the major inefficiencies of competition on mobile
phone market in Tunisia is that the evolution of interconnection rates have witnessed a low decrease after the
year 2008, but some stability between years 2003 and 2008, in the duopoly period.” Using these calculated
interconnection rates, and the calculations made above for the critical threshold of preference for collusion
(C.T.P.C.), we are able to calculate the variation of this threshold from 2003 to 2011 on the Tunisian phone
market. The results are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Evolution of the Critical Threshold of Preference for Collusion in the Tunisian Mobile Market
from 2003 to 2011.
As shown in Figure 3, the values of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C) were high
during the period 2003-2005. The curve of this threshold δ is decreasing and convex and reaches the zero
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value in 2006, when the public operator (Tunisia Telecom (T.T.)) becomes private. This threshold becomes
negative in 2010, the date that corresponds to the entry of the third operator (Orange Tunisia) on the market.
In the Tunisian mobile market, we have then since 2010:
piCompi < pi
Dev
i < pi
Coll
i
This result is logical since a decrease in the wholesale price leads to a decrease in the margin between the
retail price paid by the consumer and the interconnection rate exchanged. This encourages cartel members to
prefer not to deviate from the collusive agreement, and as a consequence, the critical threshold of preference
for collusion δ decreases.
On the other hand, another explanation can be found in the fact that the market for mobile telephony
in Tunisia was experiencing strong growth in demand during the period 2003-2005, which leads the two
operators to have a very high discount rate, and consequently, a strong preference for the future and therefore
a preference for collusion.
We’ll test econometrically the assumption (Penard (2003)) according to which any factor that increases
competition between operators is more promising incentive for collusion. We will then express the effect of
each retained variable on the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.).
The variables of the estimated model are of two kinds. Either they are related to the market structure,
or they concern the prices on the Tunisian mobile market. The first type of variables includes competition
(COMP), measured by the number of mobile operators who have installed their networks and who are
marketing their services. In fact, there is a relationship between the number of competitors and collusion,
as shown in Selten (1973) who presents a theory that investigates “the connection between the number of
competitors and the tendency to cooperate.” The importance of the number of competitors as a variable is
at the origin of the distinction made by Chamberlin (1933) between small group and the large group.
The first type of variables includes also a measure of market concentration (HHI), Expressed by the HHI
index. This index is established by summing the squared market shares (usually multiplied by 100) of all the
operators. The more the HHI index is high, the more the market is concentrated and the more preference
for collusion is strong.
The two other variables of the first kind are market shares convergence (CONV) measured by the difference
between the market shares of operators expressed in percentage (the more market shares are converging
(difference tends to zero), the more collusion is easy) and the Lerner index (LI), as presented in Debbichi
and Ben Khalifa (2013). This index reflects the degree of market power for operators. The more the price is
far from the marginal cost, the more the market power is important, and the more preference for collusion
is strong. This variable is constructed on the assumption called "Balanced Calling Pattern" (Laffont and
Tirole (2000)) and according to which, the fraction of calls from the original network and ending on the
other competing network is proportional to the market share of the competitor. In other words, the flows of
incoming and outgoing calls are balanced, even if market shares are not.
The second type of variables includes the retail prices (RP) and the wholesale ones (WP). The retail
prices represent off-net prices charged by operators expressed in local Tunisian currency without taking into
account taxes, and paid by the consumer. If the price increases, the margin between the retail price and the
wholesale price increases and hence the preference for collusion increases. The whole sale prices represent the
interconnection rates charged and exchanged between operators expressed in Tunisian local currency without
taxes. If this rate increases, the margin between the retail price and the tariff decreases and hence preference
for collusion decreases.
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All variables of the estimated model are expressed in logarithms and are estimated by the method of
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the period 2002-2011. The results are given in the following table (Table
1).
Table 1: Estimation of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) with OLS
As shown in Table 1, all variables are significant at the level of 1%. Variables associated with the
convergence of market shares (CONV) and with the wholesale prices (WP) seem to have a negative coefficient.
This means that an increase in one of these variables will decrease the critical threshold of preference for
collusion (C.T.P.C.) and will make it for the operators easier to collude. All the other variables are positively
correlated with the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.).
6 Conclusion:
The model we present above determines the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) depending
on the market structure and the nature (private or public) of the operators that are present on the market.
This threshold is a relevant indicator available for the regulator to estimate the preferences of the operators
to collude. To keep a certain degree of competition, the regulator, as in Flacher and Jennequin (2007),
can set the level of interconnection rate at a level that minimizes the preference for collusion. Our study
shows also that the critical incentive to collude depends on the level of interconnection fees. When these
fees vary, the curve of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) is generally convex in
a duopoly structure, and becomes concave in presence of three operators. We have shown also that, in a
duopoly structure, collusion becomes easier when interconnection fees increase, whereas in a market with three
operators, collusion becomes more difficult when interconnection fees are more important. Using the different
calculated values of the critical threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.), and regarding the changes
in structures observed on the Tunisian telecommunication market, we find that this estimated threshold is
decreasing and convex in time on the Tunisian market during the period 2003-2011, until reaching negative
values in 2010. This proves that there is a strong preference for collusion between the Tunisian telephony
mobile operators. This preference has increased with the privatization of the public operator that took place
in 2006 and with the increase of the number of operators in 2010. Finally, we find that, while studying the
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effect of the public-private nature of operators, the number of operators, and hence the market structure is
more important than the nature of the operators for the determination of the critical threshold of preference
for collusion.
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